When does linking two weak things produce something even weaker? Tying a rope between two sinking ships is one example helpfully suggested by ChatGPT.  But this morning I am thinking about emissions trading systems, thanks to the news of our Prime Minister’s visit to Brussels. 

An emissions trading system (ETS) is designed to find the least cost way to marginally reduce emissions at each moment in time. That is exactly the wrong way to approach the energy transition, where the aim is least cost elimination of emissions over the course of time. Those two objectives would only be the same in an economy where there was no technological change, or any other form of lasting change.

In a real economy where innovation happens, the right way to do an energy transition is to invest early in the deployment of zero emission solutions, allowing the industries, supply chains, infrastructure, financing, business strategies and consumer habits around them to develop, improve, and grow. This is the process that reduces the cost of the zero emission solutions and spreads them through society.

Almost by definition, the cost of deploying a zero-emission solution is highest when it is newest. At that stage, there are usually many ways to cut a tonne of emissions that are cheaper, but that do not make any progress in the transition. Most of these involve making fossil energy systems more efficient – a useful thing to do in parallel to a transition, but not a substitute for it.

An ETS is designed to find these easy-ways-out. By doing so, it delays the necessary deployment and development of zero emission solutions for as long as possible. As Davide Natalini, Aled Jones, Pete Barbrook-Johnson and I argued in a recent paper, that is also likely to maximise wasted investment. You could call it ‘decarbonisation at most cost’.

When two jurisdictions with ETSs are linked to create one larger ETS, the search for easy-ways-out plays out over a larger space, allowing more such half-measures to be found, and delaying the necessary actions for even longer.

Even worse is that the in-built self-limiting dynamic of the ETS then operates across jurisdictions: any progress in the transition made by one country reduces the demand for emissions permits, reducing their price, and reducing the incentive for action in the other country. When I worked in the UK energy department, at a time when the UK was still part of the EU ETS, I saw policy options that could have helped our energy transition being rejected because they would have just made it cheaper to burn coal in Poland.

If the UK is linking its ETS to that of the EU for the small gains of reducing bureaucracy and keeping more tax revenues for the Treasury, then the only way to avoid the large downsides of this approach is not to rely on the ETS to drive the transition. Use revenue-neutral subsidies, regulations, market reforms and infrastructure investments to deploy and diffuse clean technologies in each sector, following the ‘first build, then break’ pattern that has worked in transitions of the past and present.

When an ETS is understood not as an instrument for leading the transition, but as an implement for mopping up the fossils left behind – less icebreaker ship, more dredging vessel – then it is not so bad after all.  If these two metaphorical ships can be left unlinked, neither of them has to sink.

(For more on this see Five Times Faster Ch.15, ‘Stuck in first gear’.)

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